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I describe the attempt by a group of 
psychologists to reform the discipline 
into an Open Science (which I will call 
'Open Psychology'). I will first argue 
that their particular version of Open 
Science reflects the problems that gave 
rise to it and that it tries to solve. Then I 
will describe the infrastructure that this 
group of people is putting in place to 
facilitate transparency. An important 
function of this infrastructure is to 
restrict what are called 'researcher 
degrees of freedom'. In Psychology, 
transparency is as much about closing 
down as it is about opening up. I will 
then focus on the flagship project of 
Open Psychology, the Reproducibility 
Project. According to the Open 
Psychologists, the neglect of replication 
is at the core of Psychology's current 
problems, and their online infrastructure 
offers the perfect framework to facilitate 
replication and give it a place in the 
field's research process. But replication, 
I will argue, is not just an 
epistemological, methodological issue: 
it implies a particular ontology and tries 
to enact it. The Reproducibility Project, 
and Open Psychology generally, can be 
considered as social experiments, that 
attempt not only to reform Psychology, 
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En este artículo describo el intento de 
un grupo de psicólogos de reformar la 
disciplina en una Ciencia Abierta (la 
cual llamo 'Psicología Abierta'). 
Primero, argumentaré que su versión 
particular de Ciencia Abierta refleja los 
problemas que le dieron origen y los 
cuales ella intenta resolver. A 
continuación, describiré la 
infraestructura que este grupo de 
personas está implementando para 
facilitar esta transparencia. Una función 
importante de esta infraestructura es 
restringir los llamados 'grados de 
libertad del investigador'. En 
Psicología, la transparencia buscada se 
refiere tanto a delimitar cuanto sobre 
expandir las investigaciones. 
Posteriormente, me centraré en el 
proyecto emblemático de la Psicología 
Abierta, el Proyecto de 
Reproducibilidad. De acuerdo con los 
Psicólogos Abiertos, el descuido acerca 
de la replicación está en el corazón de 
los problemas actuales de la 
Psicología, y su infraestructura en línea 
ofrece el soporte perfecto para facilitar 
la replicación y darle un lugar en el 
proceso de investigación de campo. 
Pero la replicación, argumentaré, no es 
sólo una cuestión epistemológica, 
metodológica: implica una ontología 
particular e intenta ponerla en acción. 
El Proyecto de Reproducibilidad, y la 
Psicología Abierta de forma general, 
pueden ser considerados experimentos 
sociales, cuyo esfuerzo reside no sólo 
en reformar la Psicología, sino también 
en realizar/performar un nuevo objeto. 
 
 





Descrevo a tentativa de um grupo de 
psicólogos de reformar a disciplina em 
uma Ciência Aberta (a qual eu nomeio 
„Psicologia Aberta‟). Primeiro, 
argumentarei que sua versão particular 
de Ciência Aberta reflete os problemas 
que lhe deram origem e os quais ela 
tenta resolver. Em seguida, irei 
descrever a infraestrutura que esse 
grupo de pessoas está implementando 
para facilitar a transparência. Uma 
função importante dessa infraestrutura 
é restringir os chamados „graus de 
liberdade do pesquisador‟. Em 
Psicologia, transparência é tanto sobre 
delimitar quanto sobre expandir. 
Posteriormente, focarei no projeto 
emblemático da Psicologia Aberta, o 
Projeto de Reprodutibilidade. De 
acordo com os Psicólogos Abertos, a 
negligência acerca da replicação está 
no cerne dos problemas atuais da 
Psicologia, e sua infraestrutura online 
oferece o suporte perfeito para facilitar 
a replicação e dar a ela um lugar no 
processo de pesquisa de campo. Mas a 
replicação, argumentarei, não é apenas 
uma questão epistemológica, 
metodológica: implica uma ontologia 
particular e tenta operá-la. O Projeto de 
Reprodutibilidade, e a Psicologia 
Aberta de forma geral, podem ser 
considerados experimentos sociais, 
cujo esforço reside não apenas em 
reformar a Psicologia, mas também em 
performar um novo objeto psicológico 
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Crisis 
t is a common argument in Science and Technology Studies that there is, in fact, no 
such thing as science. Science is multiple and diverse, rather than unified and 
homogeneous. Similarly, it may be better to speak of Open Sciences, in the plural, than 
of Open Science. According to their particular needs and circumstances, different 
scientific fields emphasise different tools and practices associated with Open Science. 
For example, in synthetic biology the focus is on databases for sharing information 
about the building blocks of bio-engineering. Because it is a field where academic 
interests meet those of the biotechnology industry, a diverse ecology of the open and 
the proprietary appears to be taking shape (Calvert, 2012; Kelty, 2012). The field of 
High Energy Physics on the other hand is a homogeneous community, making open 
access pre-publication (via arXiv) a viable solution to the demand for faster circulation 
of research results (Gunnarsdóttir, 2005). In Psychology, the Open Science initiative is 
to a large extent a reaction to a crisis. Fundamental problems in the field have come to 
light, psychologists are up in arms about them (or dispute the fact that there are any 
serious problems), and Open Science is put forward as the solution (or rejected). 
The trouble emerged in a remarkable series of events between March 2011 and March 
2012 – Psychology's annushorribilis. The most spectacular case was the fraud of the 
Dutch social psychologist Diederik Stapel, that came to light in September 2011. Two 
more cases of fraud, less spectacular but still embarrassing, were discovered a few 
months later. Earlier that year, there had been the publication, in a top social 
psychology journal, of a paper claiming evidence for anomalous retroactive influences 
on cognition and affect: precognition (Bem, 2011). The furor over that article was 
compounded soon after when the same journal refused to publish the report of a failed 
attempt to reproduce those results, on the grounds that it never publishes replication 
studies. Then, at the end of the year, two papers were published about so-called 
questionable research practices (QRP's) – for example: modifying your hypothesis after 
I 
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you've seen the results of your experiment. The first paper showed that by fully 
exploiting the flexibility such QRP's offer, a researcher can produce the absurd result 
that people get on average one-and-a-half years younger by listening to The Beatles 
When I'm Sixty-Four (Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 2011). The second paper was a 
report of a survey among academic psychologists that aimed to measure the 
prevalence of QRP's. The results were worrying: for example, 35% admitted to having 
reported an unexpected finding as having been predicted from the start (John, 
Loewenstein & Prelec, 2012). Finally, in March 2012 a row broke out when a group of 
researchers managed to get a non-replication published of one of the most famous 
experiments in recent social psychology, the elderly walking study (Doyen, Klein, 
Pichon & Cleeremans, 2012). Suddenly, a flourishing field of study in social psychology 
was in the spotlight, and people started to wonder whether its often spectacular results 
were solid, or due to QRP's. 
By this time, the word crisis was starting to be used, and the contours of a community 
of critics began to emerge. The trouble in psychology according to these criticscan be 
briefly summarised as follows: under pressure to produce a high output of articles in 
top journals, and faced with the requirement of those top journals that articles present 
an eye-catching story backed by clean results, researchers sometimes engage in 
questionable research practices (or worse) to manufacture just such results. 
Increasingly, journals are filled with spectacular but weak research (frivolous fluff rather 
than  solid results). Because journals do not publish replications, researchers have very 
little incentive to check each other's work. Additionally, since negative results 
(experiments that 'do not work') are equally unpublishable, the field suffers from 
publication bias and an unwarranted confidence in its findings. As a result, the literature 
has become, in the words of two critics, 'a vast graveyard of undead theories' (the title 
of Ferguson & Heene, 2012). 
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The tools of transparency  
To clean up the mess and prevent further disasters, the critics advocate transparency. 
Some have proposed that journals should demand that authors disclose exactly how 
data were collected and analyzed (Simmons, Nelson & Simonsohn, 2012). Others have 
sung the praises of data sharing (Stroebe, Postmes & Spears, 2012). The most 
comprehensive solution, and the one that has been most successful, is the Open 
Science Framework (OSF). The OSF started off in November 2011 as a Google Group 
devoted to discussing Psychology's problems and various open science solutions to 
them. Now, bolstered by large grants from a.o. the Laura and John Arnold Foundation, 
the activities are coordinated by a Center for Open Science (at the University of 
Virginia), and the Framework itself (a web application) is online. 
In the OSF, after opening an account (user name, password), researchers can 
organise their work in projects. They can upload files to the project (such as stimuli 
used in the experiment, or data sets); they can add a wiki describing the project, its 
history and its current status (for example); they can check their statistics and see how 
many page views the project has had. In other words, researchers can move their 
whole workflow online, including the experiment if one uses for example Amazon‟s 
MTurk service of online workers.Most importantly, of course, each project can be made 
public, making the research process transparent for whoever cares to look.  
The convergencebetween open source and open science that Willinsky (2005) has 
noted is clear in the OSF. The Framework is built in Python; it uses Git as a version 
control system, and offers users the option to add Github as a data and code 
repository. It has also borrowed the concept of forking from open source culture: any 
user of the OSF can fork any public project and thus create a clone of it in her own 
account, with a link to the original embedded in it. This can be used for example to 
conduct a replication, or extend someone else's study in a new direction. Furthermore, 
the Center for Open Science aims to support the community at the intersection of open 
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source and open science. However, although criticism of the incentive structure in 
academia is often ventilated, what is lacking so far is a political arm to the movement: 
there is as yet no counterpart to the Free Software Foundation, for example, no 
Richard Stallman of Open Psychology.  
 
Closing down by opening up  
The explicitly stated goal of the Center for Open Science is to align the values that 
scientists hold dear and the practices that they actually engage in. According to the 
diagnosis of the Open Psychologists, the current heavy emphasis on output in 
academia has made getting it published more important than getting it right (Nosek, 
Spies & Motyl, 2012). Despite their good intentions, scientists are drawn to biased 
reasoning and exploiting the loopholes in the system to produce publishable, but not 
necessarily accurate results. Thus, Open Psychologists work with a naturalized 
epistemology which views scientists as biased reasoners (Flis, 2018). 
To counter these problems, Open Psychology offers both a carrot and a stick. 
Transparency is made attractive with alternative incentives. The Center for Open 
Science for example maintains a system of Badges for Open Practice: if the study that 
is reported in an article is based on open data, the journal publishing it can award it the 
Open Data Badge – a bit like the MSC-label for certified sustainable seafood. Thus, 
transparency itself is a reward for good conduct: now everyone can actually see your 
good behaviour. 
But transparency is also a stick that keeps researchers on the straight and narrow by 
making their work visible. In the OSF, transparency is as much about constraint and 
coveillance as it is about freedom and creativity – another example of the fact that, as 
Chris Kelty (2012) noted, the distinction between open and closed science does not 
work. The OSF for example offers the option to register a project component: this 
produces a time-stamped copy of that file and saves it for later reference. The main 
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use of this feature is for registering data analysis plans, effectively preventing many 
QRP's that consist of adapting the analysis to the data. Thus, such pre-registration 
limits “researcher degrees of freedom” (Simmons et al., 2011, p.1). The timeline 
presented on each project page has a similar function, as it automatically records and 
presents the actual order of events in a research project, preventing self-serving 
reconstructions after the fact. Likewise, the data archiving and sharing that the OSF 
facilitates are intended on the one hand to help generate new research, but on the 
other hand are also presented as ways to increase the control that researchers have 
over each other's work. 
 
Replication and the hardest science  
The primary objective of Open Psychology appears to be methodological. It is about 
doing better science by making research transparent and thus tightening standards and 
limiting unwanted flexibility. There is, however, another aspect to this initiative that is 
ontological rather than epistemological. This concerns the emphasis on replication. To 
the advocates of Open Psychology, Enhancing reproducibility and Open Scienceare 
basically the same thing (see for instance Open Science Collaboration, 2017). 
Reproducibility, they say, is the essence of science. Unfortunately, the current 
problems in psychology (QRP's, publication bias, etcetera) have led to an unknown but 
great number of irreproducible results. Open Science solves the problems, and is thus 
the best way of enhancing reproducibility. In order to gauge the extent of the problem, 
the OSF hosted a special flagship project, announced on the Google OSF group the 
day after it had opened: the Reproducibility Project (RP). The RP was a crowd sourced, 
collaborative effort to conduct replications of 100 studies reported in the 2008 volumes 
of three psychological journals. It was a self-conscious attempt at big science – the 
project had more than 150 contributors. Its report appeared in 2015 and it concluded 
that, depending on how one defined a successful replication, only about 40% of the 
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original results could be reproduced. 
Although this diagnosis of the state of the field – too many irreproducible results – is 
widely shared and many support the Open Science solution, at the same time it runs 
up against a conviction that is firmly ingrained in the minds of many psychologists: that 
human behaviour is so sensitive to context, that replication is especially difficult in this 
field. For this reason, Psychology is sometimes said to be the hardest science 
(Srivastava, 2009). Some have rejected the Reproducibility Project on this basis, 
because, they say, if a replication fails, it could be due to anything: the weather, the 
colour of the walls, the smile of the experimenter. A failed replication is therefore 
uninformative: it doesn't say anything (e.g. Stroebe & Strack, 2014). The 
Reproducibility Project is chasing a chimera. In Psychology, they insist, replication 
must take the form of conceptual replication: rather than precisely reproducing the 
original experimental conditions (a direct replication), a researcher derives a novel 
hypothesis from the same theory, and tests that. If she succeeds, the theory is 
replicated, though not the original result. 
A model of surface and depth is operative here: the phenomena of social behaviour 
(the surface) are complicated and hard to predict, and therefore difficult to reproduce. 
The mechanisms that underlie this behaviour, however, are stable and universal and 
can be described by theory. Every time a new effect is produced that can be explained 
by the theory, it is confirmed. Thus, the 'elderly walking study' may not be reproducible, 
because the experimental effect is fragile and the social context on which it depends 
has changed. The theory behind the effect, however, has been confirmed in hundreds 
of studies ever since, all of them conceptual replications of that theory. Or so its 
defenders argue. To the advocates of Open Psychology, conceptual replication is an 
important part of the scientific process, but it is insufficient to assess the solidity of 
particular results or even the theory behind them. The main reason is that a conceptual 
replication is only used to confirm a theory: if it fails, it never counts against that theory. 
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The failure simply disappears in a file drawer, and is never heard from again. 
Conceptual replication is the incarnation of confirmation bias (Pashler & Harris, 2012). 
 
Reproducible objects 
Let us consider Open Psychology as an experiment. It is, first of all, an experimental 
scientific community, that tries to reform scientific practice from the ground up by doing 
science in a transparent way, that tries to build the tools and infrastructure to support 
itself and further its ideals, and tries to survive within the constraints of the incentive 
structure that the academic world imposes on it. Its chances may depend to an 
important extent on whether it is possible in Psychology to work transparently and still 
produce the copious output that an academic career seems to require. 
But Open Psychology is also an experiment in the sense that it attempts to produce a 
new psychological object: reproducible instances of social behaviour. This was not its 
overt aim – it meant only to improve methodology – but that is what it in fact demands. 
By insisting on direct replication rather than (only) conceptual replication, Open 
Psychology is saying that Psychology should be about re-presenting overt phenomena 
as well as hidden mechanisms. If direct replication is to become a standard procedure 
in psychological research, then social behaviour must be made available for inspection 
in a reliably reproducible way. Rather than treating experimental effects as mere 
symptoms of an underlying reality of psychological mechanisms, psychologists must 
shift attention to those effects themselves and stabilize them. 
I want to connect this point about ontology with two well-known arguments from STS. 
Michael Mulkay and Nigel Gilbert (1986), in their study of replication in science, found 
that the scientists they interviewed (biochemists) consider mere replication (what 
psychologists call direct replication) to be uninteresting. Mere replication is assumed to 
be easy, and therefore conceptual replications are preferred. Only when mistakes, 
artefacts or foul play are suspected, does it become interesting to do a direct 
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replication. Psychologists have, until recently, been equally uninterested in mere 
replication, but not because it is too easy, but because it is assumed to be too hard. 
Based on the ontological premise that the social world is very different from the natural 
world – complex, fragile, unpredictable, or even historically and culturally variable – a 
form of social science has been defended that is remarkably similar to other sciences 
in rejecting direct replication. This consensus is now being challenged: more and more 
psychologists are calling for direct replication to become a central concern. My point is 
that this is not just a matter of method, of epistemology, but also of ontology, because 
direct replication demands that the much-vaunted complexity of the social be made 
visible and calculable. 
Secondly: with its emphasis on constraint, restriction of freedom, and faithful 
replication, Open Psychology may seem the perfect example of Latour's claim that the 
social sciences suffer under the mistaken belief that science is about mastery and 
control (Latour, 2000). According to Latour, their physics envy, combined with a lack of 
understanding of how physics really works, leads social scientists to seek control over 
their object, to manipulate people rather than stimulate their disobedience as they 
should. A scientist should allow the object to object, not seek to control it. From this 
perspective, Open Psychology, with its Calvinist rejection of frivolity and excess, will 
only send Psychology further down the wrong track. But there is another interpretation 
possible. The complexity, fragility, unpredictability of the social has long been a 
commonplace in Psychology, but it has largely remained a background assumption, not 
a topic in its own right. The consequences of that complexity – experiments that do not 
work – have remained hidden in the file drawer. With the increasing emphasis on direct 
replication, they will be dragged into the spotlight. The demand that experimental 
effects be reproducible in direct replications is not only challenging for the researchers,  
but it is also a challenge to the object of study itself: resist if you can! If social behavior 
is really so complex, fragile, and unpredictable, it will withstand direct replication. It is 
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precisely the attempt to make experimental effects in social psychology reproducible 
that allows those effects to show their variability. In that way, the object of Psychology 
may finally get a chance to object.  
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